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A rating trigger is a particular type of debt covenant that mandates the borrower to 
maintain its own credit rating above a certain rating threshold, requiring in the 
event of a rating downgrade the adoption of specific enforceable actions aimed at 
securing the lender claims from the borrower's higher risk level. Rating triggers 
lower the cost of borrowing capital, but in case they are activated they exacerbate 
the borrower's need for liquidity just in the moment when its credit risk is higher, 
making the borrower's default more likely to occur.  Despite the potential threat 
posed by rating triggers on debt markets, these contractual devices remain almost 
unregulated both in the U.S. and in Europe. The purpose of this paper is first to 
analyze the effects rating triggers can have on overall market risk and second to 
assess the proliferation of rating triggers among large U.S. companies in order to 
ensure whether these contractual devices need a stricter regulation. The article is 
divided in two parts. From section 2 to 5, I provide an overview on the different 
types of triggers and analyze the rationale behind their use in terms of advantages 
and disadvantages for both issuers and investors. From section 6 to 9 I perform an 
empirical analysis by assessing the rating triggers that have been used by Dow 
Jones Industrial Average index companies. I then examine the correlation between 
the use of rating triggers and the companies’ risk profiles by measuring their 
credit ratings and their Altman’s Z-Scores in order to find out whether triggers are 
mostly used by risky companies, capable of being impaired by the triggers’ 
activation and thus posing a threat to market stability. Then in section 10 I draw 
the conclusions suggesting the introduction by U.S. and European regulators of a 
specific duty to disclose all the rating triggers that listed companies include every 
year in bond indentures and in financial contracts. 
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There are three main reasons why credit ratings are relevant: first, because 
investors regard them as reliable and take them into account; second, because the 
regulators incorporate them in legal rules, forcing financial markets’ actors to 
comply with them; and finally, because financial contracts make credit rating a 
parameter that the counterparties have to take into consideration. 
Whereas the rationale behind the first cause is currently highly debated1 and the 
dynamics behind the second cause has been clearly explained by rating agencies’ 
“regulatory license” theory developed by professor Frank Partnoy2, the third 
                                                 
1 On the reputation of rating agencies within financial markets see Mathis, J., MacAndrews, J., & 
Rochet J.C. (2009), Rating theraters: Are reputation concerns powerful enough to discipline 
rating agencies?. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56, 657; Bolton, P., Freixas, X. & Shapiro, J. 
(2012), The Credit Ratings Game. The Journal of Finance, 67, 85; for a legal critique of the 
“reputational view” of rating see also Hunt, J. (2009), Credit Rating Agencies and the 
“Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a 
Proposal for Improvement. Columbia Business Law Review, 1, 109; Rousseau, S. (2009), 
Regulating Credit Rating Agencies after the Financial Crisis: The Long and Winding Road 
Toward Accountability, Capital Markets Institute Research Paper, July 2009, 43, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456708 , according to which “Reputation is a noisy indicator. Investors 
are only privy to rating agencies’ efforts indirectly through the default rate of the debt-
instruments that are rated. Thus, investors may attribute the same reputational effect to debt-
instruments that fail for different reasons such as fraud, bad luck or inaccurate rating. The lack of 
transparency of the rating process further complicates the task for investors who want to assess 
the contribution of an agency”.On the effects of rating actions’ announcements see Hand, 
J.R.M., Holthausen, R.W., & Leftwich R.W. (1992). The Effect of Bond Rating Agency 
Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices.The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 733; Norden, L., & 
Weber, M. (2004), Informational efficiency of credit default swap and stock markets: The impact 
of credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 2813. 
 
2 See the seminal works by Frank Partnoy on rating agencies’ intrinsic regulatory problem 
associated with the inclusion of credit rating references in financial regulation. Such inclusion 
attributes to rating agencies a de facto regulatory power and introduces a mandatory compliance 
with the credit rating standards embedded in law provisions. See Partnoy F. (1999) The Siskel 
and Ebert of Financial Markets: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies. Washington 
University Law Quarterly, 77, 619; Partnoy F. (2001). The Paradox of Credit Ratings. University 
of San Diego Law & Economics Research Paper No. 20/2001, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=285162;  Partnoy F. (2006). How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are 
Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in Y. Fuchita - R.E. Litan, Financial Gatekeepers: Can They 




cause, according to which ratings are made relevant by their incorporation into 
financial contracts is currently relatively unexplored by the academic research3. 
This third cause concerns a particular type of debt covenant named rating trigger, 
which is a rating based contractual clause that has been used in debt contracts for 
decades. Despite rating triggers are well known by debt market professionals, 
surprisingly a very few attempts have been made to analyze their main 
characteristics and their effects on debt market’s lenders and borrowing parties.  
Furthermore, a very few empirical analyses have been performed so far in order to 
study rating triggers diffusion, to classify the different types of rating triggers, and 
more in general to assess the magnitude of the effects that these particular rating 
based clauses have within the debt market. 
The purpose of this paper is first to analyze the effects rating triggers can have on 
overall market risk and second to assess the proliferation of rating triggers among 
large american companies in order to ensure whether these contractual devices 
need a stricter regulation. The paper is organized as follows: section 2 explains 
the nature and the function of rating triggers and describes the specific types of 
such contractual clauses; section 3 examines how rating triggers have been 
regarded over the years by financial regulators and by credit rating agencies 
themselves, and introduces the two main regulatory options that have been 
proposed so far; section 4 analyzes the positive effects associated with the use of 
rating triggers with regard to both asset substitution and adverse selection 
problems; section 5 examines the negative effects associated with the use of rating 
                                                 
3 Although there are some papers that deal with specific issues associated with rating triggers, a 
thorough analysis of the dynamics associated with these peculiar contractual devices is currently 
lacking, in part due to the interest raised by other issues concerning rating agencies, regarded as 
more important. For specific studies concerning rating triggers see Lando, D. & Mortensen, A. 
(2004). On the pricing of step-up bonds in the european telecom sector. Journal of Credit Risk, 
1(1), 71 ; Houweling, P., Mentink, A., & Vorst, T. (2004). Valuing Euro Rating-Triggered Step-
Up Telecom Bonds. Journal of Derivatives, Spring, 63; Bhanot, K. and Mello, A. S. (2006). 
Should corporate debt include a rating trigger?. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 69; 
Silva, S., & Pereira, J. A. (2008), Optimal Debt, Asset Substitution and Coupon Rating-Trigger 
Covenants, available at http://www6.fe.uc.pt/pfn2008/UserFiles/pdf/776.pdf; Koziol, C. & 
Lawrenz, J. (2010). Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency conflicts versus 
asymmetric information. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16, 182; Wiemann, M. (2010). Rating 
triggers in loan contracts –how much influence have credit rating agencieson borrowers - in 
monetary terms. Available at http://www.australiancentre.com.au/events/events-
calendar/events-2010/banking-and-finance-conference/markus-wiemann-paper-
bfc2010.pdf; Kraft, P. (2010), The Impact of the Contractual Use of Ratings on the Rating 
Process - Evidence from Rating Agency Adjustments”, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570776; Kraft, P. (2011), Do Rating Agencies Cater? Evidence 




triggers and highlights the consequences they can have on the market; section 6 
introduces the empirical part of the study and explains the scope of such analysis; 
section 7 assesses the diffusion and the magnitude of rating triggers within the 
sample of companies that have been examined; section 8 analyzes the correlation 
between the use of rating triggers and credit rating; section 9 examines the 
correlation between the use of rating triggers and the companies’ Altman Z-Score, 
regarded as a reliable measure of the companies’ overall stability; finally, section 
10 draws the conclusions based on the empirical results and suggests the 
regulatory action concerning rating triggers that appears to be more appropriate. 
 
 
2. The nature and the function of rating triggers 
 
A rating trigger is a peculiar type of covenant included in bond indentures or in 
other forms of financial and loan contracts in order to keep the borrower’s risk 
under control by pushing the borrowing party to maintain its own credit rating 
above a certain rating threshold. Once a rating trigger has been included in the 
contract provisions, if the borrower's rating gets downgraded below the designated 
threshold the lender has the enforceable right to impose the borrower a specific 
action, aimed at securing the lender’s claim from the borrower's higher risk level. 
As for other types of covenants, the borrower’s duties activated by the rating 
downgrade may vary consistently, according to the contracting parties’ autonomy.  
The nature and the function of rating triggers are topics that have been relatively 
neglected by economists and legal scholars, who have instead been more willing 
to address other general issues concerning the function performed by credit rating 
agencies within financial markets4. Nevertheless, due to the key role that rating 
                                                 
4 On the regulatory nature of credit rating see Frank Partnoy’s works mentioned in note 2; On the 
role regulator played in shaping the competition problem in the rating market and more in 
general on the contribution of poorly designed regulation to rating agencies problem, see White 
L. J. (2001), The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis, NYU Center for 
Law and Business Research Paper No 01-2001; White, L.J. (2005). Good Intentions Gone 
Awry: A Policy Analysis of the SEC’s Regulation for the Bond Rating Industry, NYU Working 
Paper n. EC-05-16, 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282540; White L. J. 
(2009) The Credit Rating Agencies: Understanding Their Central Role in the Subprime Debacle 
of 2007-2008, Working Paper EC-09-06, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U.; Hill, C.A. (2010), 
Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review, 71, 585. For a sound analysis on the state of art on credit rating sector 
and for some proposed policy solutions see Coffee, J. C. jr. (2007) The Role and Impact of 
Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime Credit Market, Testimony before the Senate Banking 
 
 
triggers had played in some famous bankruptcy cases during the early 2000s, 
some studies have been developed by professionals of the rating sector in order to 
obtain a deeper knowledge of these controversial contract clauses5.  
Although the shaping of rating triggers clauses depends ultimately on the 
agreement between the lender and the borrower, it is anyway possible to identify 
some basic types of rating triggers, which differ among each other by the 
consequences their activation has on the borrower6. 
The first type of rating triggers are named rating based collateral and bonding 
provisions. These clauses are usually included into bank loan agreements and 
once they are activated they require the borrower either to post more collateral, or 
to provide a specific letter of credit, or to secure in other ways the claim of the 
lenders placed at stake by the rating downgrade. 
The second type of rating trigger clauses, named rating step-up triggers or rating 
based pricing grids, provides that in the event of the designated downgrade the 
borrower must increase the lender’s return as a remedy for the higher risk the 
latter has to bear. When incorporated in bond indentures these clauses require the 
issuer to increase the interest paid to bondholders as its rating falls below the 
                                                                                                                                     
Committee, September 26th 2007; Coffee, J. C. jr. (2008) Turmoil in the U.S.markets: the role of 
the credit rating agencies, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, April 22nd 2008;  Coffee, J. C. jr.. (2011) Ratings Reform: The 
Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. Harvard Business Law Review, 1, 231; ECGI - Law Working 
Paper No. 162/2010. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1650802. For a seminal 
contribution to the debate on the rating agencies liability see Husisian, G. (1991). What Standard 
of Care Should Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency 
Liability. Cornell Law Review, 75, 411. 
 
5 see STUMPP, P. M. et al. (2001), The Unintended Consequences of Rating Triggers, Moody’s 
Special Comment, December 2001, where several cases highlighting the relationship between 
the use of rating triggers and the borrower’s default are presented. The most famous one is 
undoubtedly the Enron case, while other cases presented in the study involved Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company and Southern California Edison Company. On the Enron case, a specific 
report was issued in 2003 by the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States 
Senate, entitled “Enron’s credit rating: Enron’s bankers’ contacts with Moody’s and Government 
Officials”, where at page 2 is it stressed that “[Enron] investment grade rating was essential to its 
ability to enter into agreements with counterparties in the context of its trading operation, one of 
Enron’s most profitable divisions; in addition, Enron had ‘‘triggers’’ tied to credit ratings in a 
number of agreements that, in the event of a downgrade, would have either constituted a default 
or would have required Enron to post significant amounts of cash collateral”. 
 
6 This list has been drawn according to the classifications of the different types of rating triggers 
provided in STUMPP, P. M. et al. (2001), (note 5); and STUMPP, P. M. & Coppola, M.M, 
(2002), Moody’s Analysis of US Corporate RatingTriggers Heightens Need For Increased 
Disclosure. Moody’s Special Comment, July 2002, which is one of the  most detailed Moody’s 




thresholds set in the contract. Some step-up triggers may just be shaped as a 
simple precautionary measure and then refer to one single threshold usually 
corresponding to the rating notch that separates the investment grade  from the 
speculative grade section of the rating scale (BBB- according to Standard and 
Poor’s and Fitch, Baa3 according to Moody’s). Conversely, some lenders may 
well decide to shape the step-up trigger by setting several thresholds, in order to 
establish a more sensitive and immediately responsive correlation between the 
borrower’s risk reflected in its rating and the interest it has to pay. 
The third type of trigger is named acceleration trigger. These triggers, considered 
to have a severe impact on the borrower, require that in the event of the 
designated downgrade the borrower has the duty to accelerate the payment of the 
loaned capital to the lender or the payment of the bond’s principal to 
bondholders7. 
The fourth type of rating trigger, named rating based put provision, even requires 
the borrower whose rating has been downgraded below the designated threshold 
to buy back the issued debt from the lenders.  
An even more extreme fifth type of rating trigger, named rating based default 
trigger, allows the lender to regard the borrower’s designated downgrade as an 
event of default on the obligation protected by the trigger, turning the increase in 
the counterparty risk into the failure of the latter to fulfill the obligation set in the 
contract. 
The borrower’s peculiar duty to maintain its rating above a certain threshold can 
also be combined with other kinds of borrower’s pledges, in order to tailor loan 
and bond covenants whose activation require both a rating downgrade and the 
occurrence of an additional risk event. An important example of such mixed 
triggers is represented by certain forms of the famous “super poison put 
provision” which has been employed by shareholders as a valuable defensive 
measure during several takeovers and leverage buyouts that took place during the 
last few decades8. 
                                                 
7 STUMPP, P. M. & Coppola, M.M, (2002), (note 6), page 5. 
 
8 As reported in Gonzalez, F., Haas, F., Johannes, R., Persson, M.,  Toledo, L., Violi, R., Wieland, 
M., Zins, C. (2004), Market dynamics associated with credit ratings. European Central Bank 
occasional paper no. 16/ June 2004, such a super poison put provision was used in the late 
 
 
A further example of incorporation of rating references into a different species of 
covenant can be found in some prominent corporate merger cases occurred in the 
last decade, whose merger agreements included a “material adverse change” 
clause based on the merging companies' rating performance. According to such 
clauses, if the rating attributed to one of the two merging parties gets downgraded 
within a certain timespan, the other party has the right to terminate the merger, 
since the increase in its risk has made the counterparty less attractive9. 
 
 
3. Rating triggers: the rating agencies’ views and the regulator’s concerns  
 
In the early 2000s the first market actors who put emphasis on the diffusion and 
the potential effects of rating triggers were credit rating agencies themselves.  
In 2001 Moody’s released an important study on the topic - entitled “The 
Unintended Consequences of Rating Triggers” - that not only provided one of the 
first and most accurate attempt to classify the triggers used in financial 
transactions, but also warned about the consequences that certain triggers could 
have on overall market risk10. In such report the agency assessed the diffusion of 
                                                                                                                                     
1980‘s in the famous leverage buyout of RJR Nabisco, as the authors noted at page 14 : “[a] 
super poison put provision allows bondholders to sell their bonds to the issuing company at par 
value or at a premium after the occurrence of a “designated event” combined with a “qualifying 
downgrade”. Hence, super poison put provisions can be viewed as conditional rating triggers, 
conditional on a specific event or a set of events. The exact provisions varied from issue to issue, 
creating uncertainty about the strength of the protection offered in any particular bond issue. In 
response to this uncertainty, S&P began rating the event risk protection of bonds with put 
provisions in July 1989”. 
 
9 An example of this material adverse change clause based on rating can be found once again in 
Enron troubled history. At the end of 2001, some months before collapsing, Enron attempted to 
establish a merger deal with Dynergy, another Texas based company operating in the energy 
sector. Such merger agreement included a “material adverse change” clause allowing Dynergy to 
exit the agreement in case Enron credit rating would have been downgraded. The report issued in 
2003 by the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, entitled “Enron’s 
credit rating: Enron’s bankers’ contacts with Moody’s and Government Officials”, noted at page 
3 that: “Moody’s officials were concerned, however, that the merger agreement presented to 
them contained too many ‘‘outs’’ for Dynegy, principally in the form of conditions linked to 
‘‘material adverse changes’’ (‘‘MACs’’). These MAC clauses would have allowed Dynegy to 
terminate the transaction based upon, among other things, a decline in Enron’s credit rating”. For 
a study on Enron’s bankruptcy case, see Macey, J. R. (2004), Efficient Capital Markets, 








rating triggers clauses in their clients’ bond indentures and loan contracts and 
observed how their use had been increased over the years, posing new 
unpredictable challenges for financial markets’ actors. In fact Moody’s, after 
providing a careful examination of some prominent bankruptcy cases, stressed 
how some types of rating triggers (in particular the acceleration triggers and the 
put triggers) were potentially able to exacerbate a borrowing company’s liquidity 
problems, remarkably increasing the borrower’s default risk and pushing a 
downgraded company faster towards bankruptcy. In particular, Moody’s 
researchers observed that “[r]ating triggers can result in a precipitous decline in 
confidence and liquidity. [...] The loss of liquidity when a downgrade occurs may 
be stressful for the borrower, precisely at the time when the company is least able 
to deal with an associated loss of investor confidence. Such triggers can be highly 
destabilizing because all parties may not behave in a rational fashion”, and then 
they remarked that “[r]ating triggers are most often used in agreements for low 
investment grade and crossover credits - where they are most lethal”. According 
to this findings the agency drafted some policy guidelines, stressing that “Moody's 
will identify, where possible, the existence of rating triggers in each issuer's 
financial structure” and then “will incorporate the serious negative consequences 
of those triggers in [its] ratings and in [its] research” 11. 
The same agency in 2002 issued another report, entitled “Moody’s Analysis of US 
Corporate Rating Triggers Heightens Need For Increased Disclosure”12, 
expressing concerns about the effects that the increasing risk related to the 
widespread use of rating triggers in loan contracts and bond indentures could have 
on the overall market stability. The report showed the results of a survey on rating 
triggers performed by the agency, according to which “[n]early 87.5% of 
responding companies whose debt is rated Ba1 or higher reported that they had 
rating triggers. According to information supplied by these companies, only 
22.5% of the triggers were disclosed in their SEC filings. Some of the most 
problematic triggers may not be disclosed as more than half of the disclosed 
triggers related to pricing grids”. As remarked by the rating agency, the 
uncontrolled use of triggers, instead of limiting the risk for creditors and 
                                                 
11 id. page 3. 
 




bondholders, could, on the contrary, pose a serious threat on their claims’ 
satisfaction: “investors who think that they might be protected by a rating trigger 
contained in their respective agreement may well find – as in recent cases – that 
there is no protection because the trigger could potentially cause a default or 
bankruptcy adversely affecting all creditors”. In the same comment, the agency 
explained also how to factor rating triggers in its creditworthiness evaluations, 
stressing that, although “some of the more risky triggers can exacerbate a rating 
downgrade made for fundamental reasons”, nonetheless “Moody's will not 
forebear from taking a rating action because of the potential adverse 
consequences resulting from the existence of a ratings trigger”. Therefore, 
Moody’s concluded stressing that the existence of rating triggers in an issuer’s 
financial structure would have been highlighted in the agency’s evaluations and 
that “[a]n issuer’s refusal to provide information about its rating triggers to 
Moody’s [would have been] considered a negative factor in the ratings process”13. 
In the very same years, Standard & Poor’s - Moody’s main competitor - 
performed a study on the same topic, showing mixed results and making less 
concerned comments compared to Moody’s ones. In fact, in March 2002 Standard 
and Poor’s issued a report - entitled “Identifying Rating Triggers and Other 
Contingent Calls on Liquidity” - which was aimed at assessing corporate exposure 
to contingent calls on liquidity, “particularly rating triggers, that could cause a 
liquidity crisis”14. The assessment, based on the analysis of a large amount of US 
and European companies, showed that “very few companies were viewed as 
having a high degree of risk”. Nonetheless, the agency concluded that “the 
perceived difference in risk supports the need for greater disclosure, additional 
consideration for incorporation in ratings, and greater advocacy for addressing 
this risk”15. In May 2002, Standard and Poor’s issued a complete version of the 
study, stating that among roughly 1,000 U.S. and European companies assessed 
only 23 companies resulted severely affected by rating triggers, in a way that, 
once activated, they could have a serious impact on the issuers’ liquidity. 
However, S&P also stressed that none of the above mentioned companies was 
                                                 
13 Id. page 3. 
 
14 Standard & Poor’s, Identifying Rating Triggers and Other Contingent Calls on Liquidity, March 
2002. 
 




actually facing an imminent threat of a liquidity problem, since none of them was 
likely to be downgraded or put on Creditwatch list. 
After this reassuring survey by S&P, Moody’s also issued a more optimistic report 
concerning U.S. life insurance sector - entitled “Rating Triggers continue to 
constitute a Relatively Minor Threat for Most U.S. Life Insurers” - stating that 
“[n]one of Moody's rated life insurance groups possess any rating triggers in their 
contracts that carry the potential for significant adverse financial 
consequences”16. However, in the same report, Moody's stressed that the use of 
rating triggers had grown since the agency's earlier reports, both in U.S. life 
insurance sector and in transactions associated with derivative contracts. 
Moreover, for most of the years 2000s, rating triggers were not just a matter of 
concern for credit rating agencies since in the same period both American and 
European financial regulators had performed some policy analyses, addressing 
rating-based contractual clauses. 
In 2004, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European 
Parliament issued a report on the “Role and Methods of Rating Agencies” 17, 
aimed at providing an assessment of the credit rating sector, in order to ensure 
whether European Union should implement a specific regulation on credit rating 
agencies, which at that time was lacking18. In that report, the European Parliament 
acknowledged the main issues associated with the use of ratings in private 
contracts and further emphasized the need for a specific regulatory intervention, 
stressing that the Parliament: “[c]onsiders it an obligation of ratings users, 
whether in the private or in the public domain, to use ratings with proper regard 
for the stability of financial markets, especially by disclosing any rating triggers 
                                                 
16 Moody's, Rating Triggers continue to constitute a Relatively Minor Threat for Most U.S. Life 
Insurers, June 2003. 
 
17 Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, On Role and 
Methods of Rating Agencies, 2004. 
 
18 A specific regulation of the credit rating sector has been subsequently introduced in the 




included in loan agreements or face the sanction of such clauses being declared 
null and void”19.  
The Committee further explained such statement, remarking that “[t]he 
implications, for the stability of the markets, of the use made of ratings both by 
private agents, in the form of rating triggers, as well as by regulatory authorities, 
in the form of regulatory capital weights and/or bond eligibility conditions are 
serious and merit a deeper, separate analysis. Regulatory recommendations in 
this area do not seem to have matured to the point of making detailed rules 
possible, however our Rapporteur raises the prospect of introducing certain rules 
in the interests of market stability”20. 
A similar awareness of the problems related to the uncontrolled use of rating 
triggers by market actors can be found one year later in the report issued in 2005 
by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (hereinafter CESR) required 
by the European Commission to provide technical advices on possible regulatory 
measures concerning credit rating agencies21. In that report, the CESR provided 
its own opinion on rating triggers and their effects, observing that: “[n]ot all 
rating triggers are alike. Some are relatively harmless, such as those that 
incrementally increase the interest paid on loans and bonds in line with rating 
downgrades. However, some might have significant potential negative impact on 
the issuer. In this case, contractual rating triggers can seriously escalate liquidity 
problems at firms faced with a deteriorating financial outlook. For instance, when 
investors are entitled to sell their bonds back to an issuer immediately following a 
                                                 
19  Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament (note 17), page 8. 
 
20  Id., page 11. 
 
21 Committee of European Securities Regulators, CESR’s technical advice to the European 




downgrade, which results in a funding crisis just when a firm is least able to deal 
with it”22. 
With regard to possible regulatory interventions the CESR on one side stressed 
the need for a  stringent disclosure regime: “[d]isclosure of rating triggers by 
issuers has until recently been incomplete and largely ignored by analysts and 
investors. Transparency and disclosure are important features that could help 
mitigate some of the negative aspects of rating triggers.” 23. On the other hand, 
the CESR noticed that according to the European Regulation on Prospectus n. 
809/200424 an issuer already had the duty to promptly disclose every material 
covenant that could affect or restrict the use of credit facilities and to provide 
information on how to react to such covenants’ activation. Hence the CESR 
concluded that, since rating triggers could be included in such category of 
covenants, “there is no need of specific requirements in the context of the 
operation of credit rating agencies regarding the use of ratings in private 
contracts, since the current EU framework provides the necessary tools to ensure 
that the market is properly informed of the possible effects that rating triggers 
might have in the market”25. 
In the same period, on the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean, the issues 
associated with the use of rating triggers were under the scrutiny of the U.S. 
                                                 
22 Id., page 38. 
 
23 Id., page 38. 
 
24 European Regulation n. 809/2004 implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on prospectus mandates that when issuing stocks, debt, or 
derivative securities, an issuer has to disclose in the informative prospectus every material 
contract (not entered by the issuer into its ordinary course of business), affecting the issuer’s 
financial situation (ANNEX I, 22 – ANNEX IV, 15 – ANNEX IX, 12 – ANNEX X, 22 – 
ANNEX XI, 12). 
 




Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC). In January 2003 the 
SEC, as required by the section 702(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, issued a 
document entitled “Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in 
the Operation of the Securities Markets”26 in which the supervisory authority 
expressed its concerns for the role played by rating triggers in some of the most 
famous bankruptcy cases occurred at that time, observing that: “the widespread 
use of “ratings triggers” in financial contracts recently has received considerable 
attention as a result of certain high-profile bankruptcies, such as Enron and 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (“PG&E”). In the case of Enron, the use of 
credit ratings as “triggers” in trading and other financial agreements gave 
counterparties the right to demand cash collateral, and lenders the right to 
demand repayment of outstanding loans, once Enron’s credit rating declined to 
certain levels. As a result, the existence of ratings triggers contributed to Enron’s 
financial difficulties. Similarly, the impact of credit rating downgrades on PG&E’s 
financial agreements limited its ability to borrow funds to repay its short term 
debt obligations. In cases such as these, contractual ratings triggers can seriously 
escalate liquidity problems at firms faced with a deteriorating financial 
outlook”27. 
Furthermore, in the same report the SEC also mentioned the possible introduction 
of stricter disclosure requirements, aimed at preventing the rating triggers' 
negative effects: “because of the significant potential negative impact of 
contractual ratings triggers on issuers, the Commission intends to explore 
whether issuers should be required to provide more extensive public disclosure 
regarding such triggers”28. 
In the subsequent years, the debate seemed to shift from rating triggers to the 
problems affecting rating agencies’ business in general. In fact, the Credit Rating 
Agencies Reform Act adopted in 2006 in the U.S. and the E.U. Regulation n. 
                                                 
26 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating 
Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Market, January 2003 
 
27 Id., page 29. 
 
28 Id., page 29. 
 
 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies did not specifically address any issue 
concerning rating triggers. Such regulatory choices can be explained considering 
the prominent importance attributed at that time in the regulatory agenda to issues 
like credit rating agencies conflicts of interest, competition in the credit rating 
market and more generally the lack of regulatory supervision on the agencies.  
However, in the recent years, the problems associated with rating triggers seemed 
to raise concerns again, both among the agencies and the regulators. 
In fact, in November 2008 Standard & Poor's issued a report - entitled 
“Evaluating Liquidity Triggers in Insurance Enterprises” - which reaffirmed the 
concerns regarding the effects of rating triggers on overall market risk. According 
to S&P, “triggers elevate default risk, and therefore it is appropriate that ratings 
address this added risk. While two companies may be virtually identical in terms 
of operations and balance sheet, if one has material contingent liquidity calls and 
very tight triggers, we usually will consider it to have a higher credit risk”. Hence 
the agency remarked that, since “it is risky for an insurer to effectively tie its fate 
to maintaining a certain credit rating”, then “we believe there is a considerably 
higher risk when an insurer agrees to credit puts that require it to retire large 
chunks of its financing or to post new collateral against trading positions in the 
event of a downgrade. In this scenario, a downgrade could precipitate serious 
liquidity problems, or even cause insolvency. In such a case, a proposed rating 
action may be larger, or quickly followed by additional rating changes as a result 
of these events” 29. For these reasons S&P concluded stating that an extensive use 
of such provisions would have been factored into its evaluations as an unduly and 
aggressive management strategy, able to negatively impact on the issuer's rating. 
Similarly, in 2009 Moody's issued a report on the use of rating triggers in life 
insurance sector, entitled “Uptrend in rating trigger usage and the impact for US 
life (re)insurers”, in which the agency highlighted the increasing use of triggers 
during the year 2008, reversing the declining trend of the years 2006-2007. 
Moody's then explained its concerns stressing that “during periods of economic 
weakness, [...] with rising corporate defaults, rating trigger usage and severity 
tend to climb as the life (re)insurance industry's business partners and 
                                                 




counterparties seek additional protection from the potential credit deterioration 
of their (re)insurance partner” and concluded that “[a]s triggers proliferate and 
become harsher - i.e., closer to current ratings and with more material 
consequences - the more they expose the life (re)insurance industry to financial 
risk, just at a time that companies are already under great stress”30. 
Furthermore, in the last few years the regulators also seemed to pay more 
attention to rating triggers and to the use of rating in financial contracts.  
In Europe, at the end of 2010 the European Commission issued a Public 
Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies, aimed at assessing all the issues 
associated with credit rating sector that deserved to be addressed by European 
regulators. Among the various recommendations provided in the study, the 
Commission stressed the need to require investment managers to regularly review 
the use of external ratings in their investment guidelines in order to raise the 
awareness of the risk of having external rating triggers in investment contracts. 
Hence the Commission remarks that “[t]he aim would be to reduce the use of 
automatic rating triggers and to introduce some flexibility which would allow 
investment managers to deviate from external rating thresholds under specific 
conditions”31. 
In the U.S. the SEC in its annual report on Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations – required by section 6 of Credit Rating Agency Reform 
Act of 2006 – issued in January 2011 examine again the problem posed by the use 
of rating triggers, observing how “[w]hen ratings triggers are present, a decline 
in the rating of an issuer or obligor below a certain level can alter the obligations 
of parties to an agreement, for example, providing a counterparty to a derivatives 
contract with the right to demand  collateral or lenders the right to demand 
repayment of a loan. The ratings of specific rating agencies are often specified  in  
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such  agreements. The extensive use of credit ratings in private contracts has 
enhanced the importance of credit ratings to the marketplace”32. 
In conclusion, both credit rating agencies and the regulators during the last 
decades have frequently assessed the problems associated with the use of rating 
triggers and the dynamics they entail. The concerns shown by the above 
mentioned institutions seem to vary from time to time from alarmed to more 
reassuring, probably depending on the overall market conditions, since the 
macroeconomic scenario seems to influence the use of rating triggers itself. 
However, due to the mixed and sometimes slightly contradicting opinions 
provided in different times on the impact of rating triggers, such area needs to be 
further investigated in order to understand the extent to which rating triggers are 
used by large corporations and consequently which regulatory action has to be 
taken by the regulator. In particular, the magnitude of the use of rating triggers 
may suggest whether to introduce a specific mandatory disclosure rule concerning 
rating based covenants – as pointed out by the CESR and the SEC over the years - 
or to opt for a more extreme approach including the ability to block under 
particular circumstances the triggers’ activation by legally declaring rating based 
clauses null and void, as suggested by the European Parliament in 2004. 
 
 
 4. The bright side of rating triggers 
 
4.1  Rating triggers as a lender’s protection against asset substitution 
problems 
In order to shed some light on the rationale behind the use of rating triggers in 
financial contracts, it is first necessary to highlight the link between this type of 
contractual provision and the asset substitution problem. 
Asset substitution is a famous problem affecting the contractual relationships 
between shareholders and debt holders of a company. To sum up, as 
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acknowledged for the first time several decades ago33, the coexistence in a 
corporation of both shareholders' and debt holders' claims may lead to a conflict 
between these two categories of claimants. In fact, shareholders’ potential 
remuneration is variable, depending on the company’s profits, and it is positively 
correlated with the risk that the company bears, whereas the debt holders’ 
remuneration is fixed - i.e. the principal plus the interest - regardless of the risk 
profile of the projects engaged by the company.  
Since corporate decisions are taken by the shareholders, they may decide to shift 
the company activities towards a higher risk level, exchanging low risk assets for 
high-risk investments. The shareholders, by doing so, will increase both the 
overall company's risk and the company's expected profits, and in particular their 
own expected remuneration. On the other hand, under the company's higher risk 
profile, the debt holders’ fixed compensation would remain the same but their 
claim would be less secured due to the company’s higher probability of default 
associated with its engagement in risky projects. Therefore, this problem is known 
by the name of “asset substitution” because the shareholders substitute safe assets 
with risky investments at the expense of the debt holders, or by the name of  “risk-
shifting” because the shareholders, in order to maximize their profits, try to shift 
the risk to debt holders. 
One of the best ways to address asset substitution problems lies in the use of debt 
covenants, which are contractual devices included in loan contracts and bond 
indentures by debt holders in order to redistribute risk between the shareholder 
and the debt holder so to prevent the shifting of risk from the former to the 
latter34. In fact, a debt covenant is a clause that forces the borrower (i.e. the 
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shareholder) to take (affirmative covenant) or to avoid (negative covenant) 
specific actions in order to protect the lender’s (debt holder’s) claims and to keep 
the company’s risk under control. According to one of the most famous analyses 
provided on the topic, the covenants can encompass various and diversified 
pledges35.  
Some covenants may restrict the company’s productions strategies and investment 
policies, preventing the firm from engaging in certain business projects or from 
investing in certain securities; other covenants may restrict the company’s 
disposal of assets, prohibiting the transfer of the ones regarded as strategic; others 
may force the company to secure bondholders’ debt, entitling bondholders to 
satisfy their claims on certain pledged assets until the bonds are paid in full; other 
covenants may restrict mergers, prohibiting them at all or permitting them only 
after specific conditions are met (e.g. the lenders/bondholders’ approval). Some 
other covenants limit the payment of dividends to shareholders, in order to 
restrain the specific action by which shareholders usually impoverish the firm’s 
assets; other covenants may instead pose limitations on the issuance of new 
tranches of debt that would be able to increase the number of claimants and 
further dilute the firm’s assets; others may instead limit the ability of the firm to 
draw rental or leasing contracts that may result in a similar dilution effect. Finally, 
some covenants may simply establish a duty to inform debt holders, for example 
by providing them with certain reports, financial statements or certifications. As a 
result, debt covenants can be extremely diverse and it is possible for borrowers 
and lenders to combine and customize them in order to carve the contractual 
provisions that best suit the company's specific profile.  
Despite the potential of such a great variety of clauses, however debt covenants 
show a remarkable weakness that is able to hinder their effectiveness. In fact, the 
company's lack of compliance with the pledges they are based on can be 
sometimes hard to detect for a dispersed and non-coordinated group of claimants 
like debt holders. In order to make the covenant pledge enforceable, debt holders 
may actually need to constantly monitor the company’s (i.e. the shareholders’) 
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compliance. This sometimes means to bear remarkable costs that make the 
covenant adoption more expansive, less effective, and thus less attractive36. 
This costly monitoring problem, on the contrary, does not affect rating triggers at 
all. In fact, a rating trigger forces the company to comply with a clear and 
straightforward requirement, i.e. to keep its own credit rating above a certain 
threshold. In addition, the compliance with such pledge is extremely easy to 
monitor for debt holders by browsing financial press or the rating agency website, 
without bearing any significant cost. 
Therefore, rating triggers are probably the less costly and the most effective form 
of debt covenant debt holders may include in a contract. In fact, such an easy and 
inexpensive regime of verification poses virtually no risk that any sophisticated 
shareholder might try to conceal the breach of the covenant, engaging in asset 
substitution practices in spite of the subscribed binding pledge. 
Hence, if debt holders agree on the reliability and on the significance of credit 
rating in terms of risk evaluation, they will consequently favor debt issues that are 
secured by rating triggers, instead of those that are protected by other covenants 
that appear more difficult to understand and more costly to monitor and enforce. 
This first set of advantageous features is one of the main reasons why rating 
triggers are popular among borrowers and are consequently able to lower the 
interest paid to the lenders. In fact, rating triggers allow sophisticated lenders to 
discount the amount of monitoring costs they would bear under the protection of a 
different covenant from the interest they require, thus making the cost of rising 
debt capital cheaper. 
 
 
4.2  Rating triggers as a way to lower the borrower’s cost of raising debt 
capital 
The aforementioned strong favor that debt holders are likely to show for rating 
triggers is also able to highlight the reason why issuers/borrowers are willing to 
incorporate rating triggers in their bond indentures and in their loan contracts. A 
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simple explanation can be found considering the use of rating triggers as a 
solution for the classic market information problem called adverse selection37. 
In fact, a remarkable part of potential debt holders is composed by relatively 
unsophisticated actors who are unable to assess the actual risk profile associated 
to all the companies in the market. Therefore, debt holders cannot assign the 
appropriate price to the debt issued by every single company nor require the right 
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amount of interest accordingly. Conversely, they are more likely to show a 
defensive attitude and then treat at the same manner the debt issued by companies 
that have different risk profiles, requiring every borrower to pay the interest rate 
corresponding to the riskiest companies in the market, and thus harming the less 
risky ones that deserved a lower interest rate. 
Furthermore, this inability to discriminate between high-risk and low-risk debt 
issues may even not be affected by the lender’s willingness to subscribe covenant 
pledges. In fact, when most of the covenant pledges that bind the borrower are 
equally difficult to monitor and to enforce, potential debt holders (unsophisticated 
ones in particular) would keep playing defensive and continue to consider all the 
debt issues at the same manner, being unable to estimate the actual cost of the 
covenants’ activation or being unable to bear the cost of such estimation itself.   
In this scenario, every company which is confident in its ability to repay its debt 
may decide to provide potential lenders with a signal, aimed at persuading them 
about the degree of soundness and reliability of its assets. The easiest way to 
reassure potential debt holders on the actual value of the company’s debt is to 
include in the contract a device that allows them to easily control the company’s 
risk without any additional cost, a contractual device which is consequently easy 
to enforce, in other words a rating trigger. Therefore, the incorporation of a rating 
trigger may ultimately act as a signal of the company's sound financial conditions 
and of its consequent ability to repay the debt. For this reason, in case lenders are 
rational and do not intend to recklessly conceal their actual risk profile, rating 
triggers improve the information available to potential lenders by allowing them 
to detect the companies that are confident in their ability to repay their debt, and 
ultimately help them require from each lender the optimal amount of interest. 
 
5. The dark side of rating triggers 
 
5.1  Rating triggers as a credit cliff enhancing factor 
As clearly pointed out in the credit rating agencies’ reports mentioned above in 
section 3, the primary concern associated with the use of rating triggers concerns 
the ability of this kind of clauses to increase overall debt market risk. 
As remarked in the previous section, the inclusion of a rating trigger in a debt 
contract is able to lower the cost of a company’s debt by exchanging a portion of 
 
 
the interest required by debt holders for a more pervasive control right over the 
company’s risk. According to these dynamics, the inclusion of a rating trigger is in 
theory optimal for companies whose probability to breach the rating threshold is 
sufficiently low so that the cost of the trigger’s activation - discounted by its 
probability - is lower than the difference between the higher interest the company 
should have paid without using the rating trigger and the lower interest the 
company actually pays thanks to the rating trigger’s inclusion38.  
The above described dynamics refer to the rational way a company should handle 
rating triggers, but in practice companies may be more irrational and short sighted 
and then decide to include a rating trigger even when the risk to be downgraded - 
and hence to activate it - is significantly high. The consequences of such reckless 
behavior can seriously affect the company's financial stability. In fact, the 
economic structure of a rating trigger appears to be not so different from a risk 
event insurance device that grants a premium to the debt holders in the event of a 
rating downgrade, except that in such situation the insurer turns out to be the same 
entity affected by the damaging event. 
Therefore, a company which subscribes several rating triggers without carefully 
estimating the risk of their activation is likely to be unexpectedly forced either to 
post additional collateral, to pay additional interests, to accelerate the payment of 
the principal or even to buy back the whole debt the company itself has issued. In 
case the impact of such enforceable actions has not being predicted and studied in 
advance, the company may precipitate into a severe liquidity stress condition. 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that, while a company might be relatively 
able to control the negative or affirmative actions which others types of covenants 
are based on (i.e. a certain debt-to-equity ratio, the disposal of certain assets, etc.), 
it is not able on the contrary to exercise the same degree of control over its own 
credit rating. In fact a credit rating depends on several factors: some of them are 
related to the company’s business model and its financial conditions, but some 
others pertain to the macroeconomic scenario and to the general financial market 
conditions, presenting a more exogenous character. 
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Therefore, it may not be easy for a company to accurately estimate in advance its 
probability of being downgraded, since the actual weight of many influential 
credit risk factors is known only to the rating agency itself and it is beyond the 
company's control. 
Hence in the case of a weak or unprepared company, the activation of a rating 
trigger could severely affect the ability to recover from the liquidity stress caused 
by the trigger’s pledge and then turn the downgrade into a default. In fact, if we 
assume that a rating downgrade usually occurs when the company’s financial 
conditions are getting worse, the activation of the triggers could further drain the 
liquidity in the moment in which it is more difficult for the company to deal with 
this kind of shock. In fact rating triggers, by affecting a company that is already 
weakened by a downgrade, are able to enhance a phenomenon known as “credit 
cliff”, according to which a company that has got impaired by an event that 
deteriorated its risk profile, is further and more seriously harmed by the need for 
liquidity resulting from that very same risk profile deterioration. Similarly, a 
rating trigger is activated when the company’s financial conditions have gotten 
worse enough to cause a rating downgrade, which is itself an event that 
automatically increases the company’s cost of debt. In addition, in this very same 
situation of financial distress the company has to face the trigger’s pledge, further 
draining its own liquidity and turning its overall conditions from worsened to 
even dramatic. Therefore, according to these dynamics a reckless use of rating 
triggers can start a snowball effect that in the most serious cases is able to push a 
company into a financial death spiral. 
Moreover, under such a serious course of events, rating triggers instead of 
protecting the debt holders’ claims end up achieving the opposite goal and leave 
them completely unsatisfied by forcing the company to file for bankruptcy, 
sometimes even pushing debt holders themselves in financial distress, increasing 
not only the issuer’s risk but also the overall debt market risk. 
In fact, over the last decades, rating triggers have mainly raised concerns due to 
this intrinsic contradiction they show: on one side they are aimed at protecting 
debt holders' claims by limiting the risk debt holders have to bear, but on the other 
hand if they're not carefully managed by the contracting parties, they act as 
powerful destabilizing devices that contribute to increase and further spread the 
risk all over a company's debt holders. This contradiction can also be observed 
 
 
from the company/borrower’s point of view, since rating triggers, in theory aimed 
at lowering the borrower's cost of raising debt, if recklessly used are able to 
precipitate the company into a credit cliff situation, raising the cost of its debt to a 
point that hinders the company's ability to refinance itself and make it impossible 
to recover from the liquidity shock. 
 
5.2  Rating triggers as a disturbance factor for rating agencies evaluations 
Another problem associated with rating triggers concerns the relationship between 
these contractual provisions and the rating agencies themselves. In fact, the 
agencies perform their evaluations on issuers’ creditworthiness taking into 
account all the information they are able to collect from the issuers themselves 
and from other market sources.  
However, despite their sophisticated status, the agencies are not always able to 
collect all the relevant information, since many documents are confidential and 
the companies may not be willing to disclose such deal of information if they fear 
it might have detrimental effects on their final credit ratings. This is exactly the 
case for rating triggers, since they are very often included in loan contracts which 
are not made publicly available through the company annual disclosure. 
Therefore, the rating agencies may be completely unaware of the rating triggers 
that affect a company's stability and deteriorate its risk profile. Such situation 
appears to be destabilizing for two main reasons: first because the agencies are not 
able to properly factor the risk posed by rating triggers into their evaluations, 
issuing ratings that are not perfectly corresponding to the company's actual risk 
profile; second - and most importantly - because the agencies are largely unaware 
of the broader and more serious consequences associated with their credit rating 
downgrades.   
Every rating downgrade decided by the agencies is in fact supported by a specific 
study demonstrating that a particular issuer, according to several factors, has a 
certain risk profile. If such evaluation is itself able to trigger certain contractual 
devices that further deteriorate the company’s risk, the agency's evaluation 
automatically does not fit the (worsened) company's risk profile anymore, 
becoming misleading and rather meaningless. 
This mechanism appears to be even more dangerous if we consider that some 
studies have demonstrated that under certain circumstances rating changes 
 
 
themselves can have a pro-cyclical effect, amplifying the positive or negative 
trend the rated company is experiencing39. In this perspective, the activation of 
triggers can further exacerbate in a pro-cyclical way the downturn a company is 
facing, turning a negative but transient market trend into an irreversible 
impairment. 
These concerns themselves suggest already that regulators should at least 
introduce a general duty to disclose all the contractual provisions whose activation 
is based on rating, regardless of the confidential nature of the contracts in which 
they are included. Under such a stricter transparency regime the rating agencies 
would be able to incorporate rating triggers in their evaluations, taking them into 
account when deciding whether to downgrade or upgrade a rated company. 
 
 
6. Rating triggers’ use among Dow Jones Industrial Average companies: the 
scope of the analysis  
 
In the light of the problems described above, it is important to attempt an 
empirical analysis that could shed some light on the magnitude and the diffusion 
of rating triggers. The main tasks of such analysis are to explain how rating 
triggers are correlated with a company’s risk profile and to suggest which type of 
regulatory intervention should be implemented accordingly, in order to manage 
and restrain rating triggers’ harming effects. 
In order to achieve these objectives, I have assessed the diffusion of rating triggers 
among the companies included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index and I 
have observed the variety of their content during the period from the year 2001 to 
the year 2010. I have chosen the Dow Jones Industrial Index (hereinafter DJIA) 
since it constitutes a sample of companies that belong to sufficiently diverse 
business sectors, and are large and sophisticated enough to issue a considerable 
quantity of debt and consequently to make a significant use of covenant 
provisions. 
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In order to have a clearer picture of the companies’ actual risk profile, the analysis 
encompasses all the rating triggers that could be found in the companies’ annual 
statements, regardless of the fact that they related to bond indentures, credit 
facilities agreements or other types of debt securities. In other words, since 
restricting the search for triggers to some securities contracts only would have 
probably provided a flawed and uncertain picture of the phenomenon, every kind 
of rating trigger included in every form of debt contracts has been included into 
the research scope. 
For the purpose of this analysis the timespan that has been considered is the 
decade starting from the year 2001 and ending with the year 2010. Such time 
period has been considered optimal for two reasons: first because the first decade 
of the years 2000’s is very close to the present times and allows to obtain results 
that are still actual and rather consistent with the market’s current conditions; 
second because such decade encompasses diverse and sometimes conflicting 
market trends, covering two periods of “bull” market (2003-2007 and 2009-2010) 
and two periods of “bear” market (2001-2003 and 2007-2009). 
A hypothesis that is very interesting to test is whether rating triggers are more 
frequently used during recessive periods, when raising debt capital is more costly 
and when, at the same time, their activation is more likely to occur – due to the 
increased global market risk – and more harmful to issuers. 
Unfortunately, this kind of test cannot be properly performed due to flaw 
concerning rating triggers’ disclosure regulation. More specifically, the regulation 
in force in the U.S. and in Europe prescribes to disclose in the annual statement 
only those debt covenants that can be regarded as material according to the way 
they are able to impact the company’s financial conditions40. Since the material 
character of the covenants is ultimately evaluated by the company itself, it is very 
likely that many rating triggers could have been labeled as “non material” in order 
not to disclose them, especially when their activation could have severe effects on 
the company’s stability (i.e. when it would have been more interesting for the 
purpose of this research) 41.  
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Therefore, in approaching this research the above mentioned caveat has to be 
taken into account. Nevertheless, the core of the analysis is not seriously affected 
by this regulatory weakness. In fact, it is clearly possible to infer that every 
positive correlation between the use of rating triggers and the company’s 
weakening risk profile that can be found assessing the annual statements is 
anyway consistent and, if ever, it could actually be simply stronger than what the 
data may show. 
Then, after having assessed the incidence of triggers in the companies’ debt 
contracts, the analysis focuses on the issuers' credit rating performance over the 
same period, in order to evaluate how the use of rating triggers is related to the 
issuers' credit risk, affecting their credit ratings.  
In case the analysis shows that the use of rating triggers is positively correlated 
with the issuers’ low credit rating, it might mean that rating triggers are mostly 
used by companies that have a high credit risk and then that the more they are 
used, the more they are likely to be activated by a downgrade. 
Such a result would then be consistent with the “credit cliff enhancing” effect 
hypothesis, since it would demonstrate that especially during recessive periods, 
the mere use of rating triggers can worsen the issuer's conditions in a way that 
may lead to a downgrade that is able to activate the trigger, making the issuer 
financial situation more and more critical. 
These observations on the relationship between the use of rating trigger and the 
issuer credit rating are ultimately aimed at assessing whether issuers make use of 
triggers in a rational way that takes into account the likelihood of triggers' 
activation, or, conversely, whether issuers show a more reckless and irrational 
behavior, using triggers when they are more likely to be activated. In fact, the 
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observation of the correlation between an intensive use of trigger and a low credit 
rating may show whether an issuer is more deeply affected by rating triggers 
when its creditworthiness is weaker and then the triggers’ activation is more likely 
to occur. 
The observation of such destabilizing pro-cyclical effect would also highlight the 
need for a regulatory intervention meant to counterbalance, in period of market 
stress, the overall risk resulting from the massive use of triggers. 
For such purpose, two main regulatory options have to be taken into consideration 
so far. The first (and “softer”) regulatory solution is the one usually proposed by 
the CESR, the SEC and the rating agencies themselves42, which consists in 
requiring the issuers to disclose every single rating trigger they embed in their 
financial contracts every year.  
This regime of mandatory disclosure has to be evaluated in his costs and benefits. 
On one side such disclosure requirements would be able to improve the 
information available to investors by discouraging potential unprotected 
lenders/bondholders to enter financial contracts with borrowers/issuers that are 
affected by an excessive number of rating triggers, then reducing the overall 
market risk. On the other side, mandatory disclosure cannot affect those rating 
triggers that are already in force or that have been kept undisclosed so far, whose 
activation could still be harmful in a period of severe crisis. 
The second and more radical regulatory option, which is mentioned in 2004 
European Commission consultation paper is aimed at introducing a system of 
sanctions that under particular conditions (i.e. when the company does not 
disclose its rating triggers) forces market actors to temporarily delay or even to 
nullify the activation of rating triggers, preventing such clauses from being 
suddenly activated all together in order to limit the increase of the default risk 
across financial markets. 
This regulatory action would pose several issues with regard to the incentives that 
it would provide to potential lenders. In fact, it is clear that such an intrusive 
regulatory interference in private financial contracting could deeply affect the 
rationale of rating triggers themselves: if lenders cannot rely on a timely 
activation of the trigger that secure their claims, they wouldn't accept the lower 
                                                 
42 See supra section 3. 
 
 
rate of interest associated with the same rating trigger, increasing the cost of debt 
borne by the issuer. In other words, if the borrowers’ pledges associated with 
rating triggers suddenly become unreliable due to their regulatory framework, 
even the good effects of rating triggers get immediately nullified. 
 
 
7. The incidence of rating triggers 
 
In order to assess the magnitude of the rating triggers’ use among the company 
included in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, I have checked all the 
statements issued annually by such sample of companies between 2001 and 2010. 
The list of the examined documents varies from company to company according 
to the way they present information to investors. In fact, provided that all of the 
companies’ statements that must be annually disclosed have been examined (e.g. 
the annual statements disclosed to the shareholders and to the market, the form 
10k and the form 8k required by the SEC, etc.), sometimes further non specific 
forms of financial reporting, if available, have been taken into consideration when 
they could contain relevant information. As previously mentioned, every type of 
contractual agreement containing rating triggers has been included in the analysis 
in order to have a broad picture of the company’s overall exposure to rating 
triggers. The data mining process has been performed collecting the documents 
obtained searching several financial databases and in particular Mergent Online®. 
In addition, since not all the types of rating trigger have the same disruptive effect 
on the issuer’s credit risk (see supra, section 2) a very basic weighting system has 
been applied to every detected different kind of triggers, in order to take in to 
account the actual impact of every species of triggers according to the risk they 
pose on each company. Therefore, a weight of 1 has been assigned to less risky 
rating triggers type, i.e. the rating based collateral and bonding provisions; a 
weight of 2 has been assigned to the step-up triggers, a weight of 3 has been 
assigned to the acceleration triggers, a weight of 4 to the rating based put 
provision , a weight of 5 to the rating based default triggers.  
This weighting system, although not perfectly accurate and quite basic, appears to 
be nonetheless useful to incorporate in the analysis the substantially diverging 
effects embedded in different rating triggers types, according to which for 
 
 
example a single put trigger forcing the issuer to buy back a certain amount of 
debt can affect the company’s financial stability more than several collateral 
rating triggers requiring such company to simply post more collateral. 
The assessment has shown that from 2001 to 2010 about 9 - 10 rating triggers 
clauses per year were on the average active among the DJIA index constituents, 
with a maximum of 12 in the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and a minimum of 7 in the 
years 2009 (see Table 1).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
After the observation of these results it is possible to provide two different 
explanations to such fluctuation in the use of triggers. On one side it seems that 
rating triggers were used in a cautious way that could restrain their harmful effects 
when the global market risk was higher, in other words more frequently during 
“bull market” years (such as from 2003 to 2005) and then more rarely under “bear 
market” years (such as from 2007 to 2009). Nonetheless, an alternative 
explanation consistent with the caveat expressed above43 could suggest that since 
the disclosure of triggers has never been strictly mandatory, some companies may 
have chosen to conceal the use of triggers during declining market years in order 
to appear less risky during such a difficult global market situation. 
Furthermore, it is possible to observe that most of the triggers were used by six 
DJIA constituents (Alcoa Inc., American Express Co., AT&T Inc., General 
Electric Co., JPMorgan Chase and Co., Kraft Foods Inc.). These six companies, 
corresponding to 20% of the whole sample appeared to make an extensive use of 
rating triggers, being subject to triggers at least for more than four years from 
2001 to 2010. If the amount of rating triggers detected within the sample is 
consistent with 2002 Moody’s report findings44, according to which only the 
22,5% of the triggers get publicly disclosed, we may infer that on the average 
approximately 44 triggers were actually in force every year among DJIA 
companies from 2001 to 2010. 
                                                 
43 see supra page 25 
 
44 see Stumpp P.M., & Coppola, M.M. (note 6), page 3. 
 
 
Hence, if the DJIA can be regarded as a valuable sample that is able to reflect the 
global market situation, it is possible to infer that rating triggers were used in an 
extensive way only by a minority of companies, making their consequences on the 
global market risk less threatening. 
The sample of the companies appears to be too small and too diverse to highlight 
a specific correlation between the use of rating triggers and a particular industrial 
sector, since two of the companies belong to the financial sector, one to the 
telecommunications sector, one to the energy sector, one to aluminium industry 
and one to the food sector.  
The types of triggers that have been used by such companies appear to be very 
diverse, encompassing rating based collateral and bonding provisions, step-up 
triggers, acceleration triggers and rating based put provisions. Since every 
specific type of rating triggers is able to impact the conditions of each company in 
a different way, it is therefore necessary to apply the above described system of 
weights to all the triggers’ types, in order to obtain a more precise picture of each 
company’s real exposure to such rating based clauses (see Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The type of triggers that has been mostly used by DJIA constituents are rating 
based collateral and bonding provisions that are probably the less risky type of 
trigger. However, some issuers have also disclosed to have made an extensive use 
of acceleration triggers and rating based put provisions that are considered to be 
among the riskiest types. 
Once again it is useful to stress that these companies appear to be the ones with 
the higher exposure to rating triggers according to the information disclosed in 
their annual statements and public reports. Hence on one side it is possible to infer 
that these are actually the DJIA constituents that have the greater exposure to 
triggers, since the more a company uses rating triggers the more such triggers are 
likely to be considered material and then have to be mandatorily disclosed.  
Nonetheless, we cannot completely ignore that further companies within the DJIA 
may have used triggers without disclosing them, thus making the actual picture 





8. The correlation between rating triggers and credit rating 
 
In order to measure the threat rating triggers can pose to global market stability, it 
is necessary to assess whether the companies use triggers when they are 
financially sound, making the triggers’ activation more remote, or – conversely - 
when their financial conditions are weaker and thus when a rating downgrade is 
more likely to activate the triggers in force. 
Therefore, the rating performance of all the above mentioned six DJIA companies 
has been taken into consideration as a reliable measure of their credit risk. In 
order to use a more reliable rating scale, both Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
rating have been taken into account for the purpose of the analysis. In particular, 
the average rating between the ones issued by the two agencies (when both 
available) has been used as the final credit rating measure.  
When the ratings issued by the two agencies diverged by one notch only, a 
prudential approach has been adopted by using as final rating the lower one 
among the two (see Table 3). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
It is important to notice that the final credit ratings show that the DJIA companies 
that used rating triggers constantly kept an investment grade rating45 over the 
examined period, thus being regarded as relatively safe and reliable.  
In addition, for practical reasons the agencies’ rating expressed in a letter scale 
(from D to AAA/Aaa) has been converted into a 21-notches numerical scale, 
ranging from 0 (corresponding to the D on the letters scale) to 5.25 
(corresponding to AAA/Aaa on the letter scale), being the difference between two 
subsequent notches equals to 0.25 (see Table 4). 
                                                 
45  The investment grade rating - corresponding to the ratings above Standard and Poor’s and Fitch 
BBB-, or above Moody’s Baa3 - is extremely important since it is regarded by market 
participants as the threshold that divides issuers that have a good creditworthiness from issuers 
that have a speculative ratings, thus having a low probability “to meet their financial obligations 




[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Then, once the numerical ratings of the triggers users from 2001 to 2010 have 
been obtained, the very same conversion has been applied to the other DJIA 
constituents’ credit ratings in order to calculate the average numerical rating of the 
DJIA index over the same period. Such average rating performance ranges from 
4.24 in 2009 (approximately corresponding to A+/ A1) to 4.47 in 2001 
(approximately corresponding to AA-/Aa3) and its fluctuation is thus equal to one 
notch (see Table 5). 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Once the rating performance of each rating triggers’ user has been compared to 
the average DJIA rating performance, it is possible to observe that among the 
assessed six rating triggers’ users, three of them (Alcoa Inc., AT&T Inc. and Kraft 
Foods Inc.) have a rating performance constantly lower than the index average by 
one notch or more, one (American Express Co.) has a rating performance that is 
lower than the average by approximately one notch, one (JPMorgan Chase & Co.) 
has a rating performance equal or higher than the average by one notch, and one 
(General Electric Co.) has a rating performance constantly higher than the average 
by more than one notch (see Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Therefore, it is possible to observe that the majority of the triggers’ users have a 
credit rating that is lower than the index average and in three cases – Alcoa Inc. 
from 2007 to 2010, AT&T Inc. in 2002 and 2004, and Kraft Foods Inc. from 2007 
to 2010 – their rating are very close to the speculative grade threshold, equal to 
BBB- or 3.00. Conversely, the rating of the other two DJIA constituents appears to 
be high, reaching sometimes the top rating for several years (General Electric Co. 
from 2001 to 2008).  In conclusion, Most of the companies that use rating triggers 
have a rating that is lower than the DJIA index average, some of them even 
 
 
getting close to the speculative grade, whereas only one of them has constant and 
remarkably high credit rating. 
 
 
9. The correlation between rating triggers and the Z-Score 
 
After having examined the companies’ credit rating, the Altman’s Z-Score46 of all 
the DJIA rating triggers’ users has also been evaluated, in order to even more 
accurately assess the correlation between the use of rating triggers and the risk 
faced by the issuer. The measurement of such risk parameter is able to provide a 
more reliable risk profile of the company during the time it has been affected by 
triggers. In fact, the Z-Score measures the company’s probability of going 
bankrupt based on its current financial conditions embedded in its balance sheet.  
Companies having a Z-Score above 3 are considered to be safe and sound, 
companies having a Z-Score between 3 and 1.8 are considered to be in a sort of 
borderline area, then companies having a Z-Score below 1.8 are considered to be 
in a distress situation.  
Z-Score differs remarkably from credit rating, since the former is a point-in-time 
measure of risk, based on the company current financial status, whereas the latter 
is a through-the-cycle measure of credit risk, that also incorporates future 
variables in the evaluation, e.g. the company’s perspective business opportunities 
or the market trends47. In addition, while the Z-Score is based on quantitative 
factors only, credit rating is also based on qualitative components that make it a 
                                                 
46  The Altman’s Z-Score is a model created by professor Edward Altman in 1968 in order to 
measure the likelihood of a company bankruptcy. The model developed by Altman combines 
several different financial ratios in order to obtain a score related to the company financial 
stability: the lower is the score, the higher is the probability for the company to go bankrupt. 
Companies showing a Z-Scores above 3 are considered to be sound and unlikely to go bankrupt, 
scores in between 1.8 and 3 are considered a sort of borderline area, and scores below 1.8 are 
regarded as a sing of the company distress. See Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial Ratios, 
Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, Sept., 
189; see also Altman, E. I. (2000), Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-
Score and Zeta® Models, available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~ealtman/Zscores.pdf.  
 
47  On rating agencies’ “through-the-cycle” methodology and the “point-in-time” perception of 
investors see Altman, E. I., & Rijken, H. A. (2004), How Rating Agencies Achieve Rating 
Stability, Journal of Banking & Finance, 28, 2679; Löffler, G. (2004), An anatomy of rating 




more comprehensive measure of risk but also a less accurate and more 
discretionary one. 
In case the Z-Score shows that most of the companies tend to use rating triggers 
when their financial conditions are impaired and they are relatively close to 
bankruptcy, such finding would mean that the companies use such clauses when 
their activation is more likely to occur, posing a risk for the entire market. 
Moreover, the Z-Score is not compatible with the companies that belong to the 
financial sector because of the highest complexity of their balance sheets and due 
to their frequent use of off-balance sheet items. Therefore this part of the analysis 
must necessarily be restricted to the four rating triggers’ users that belong to 
industries other than financial services (i.e. Alcoa Inc., AT&T Inc., General 
Electric Co, Kraft Foods Inc).  
The yearly Z-Scores from 2001 to 2010 of the rating triggers users have been 
calculated using the balance sheets and the income statements available on 
Mergent Online® database48. Then all of the other DJIA constituents’ Z-Scores 
have been calculated in the very same way, in order to obtain the yearly average 
Z-Score of the DJIA index over the decade from 2001 to 2010 (see Table 6). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Through the evaluation of the rating users’ Z-Score it is possible to observe that 
all of the triggers’ users appear to have a low Z-Score, ranging from 0.93 (AT&T 
Inc. In 2006) to 2.13 (Alcoa Inc. in 2007), and then that their Z-Scores mostly 
belong to the distressed area (< 1.8) or in the best cases to the borderline area 
(3.00 > Z > 1.8). Therefore it is possible to infer that there is a positive correlation 
between the use of rating triggers and a low Z-Score (see Table 7). 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
  
This correlation appears to be even clearer if the companies’ Z-Scores are 
compared to the average DJIA index Z-Score, showing that all of the DJIA 
constituents that have made an extensive use of rating triggers have a Z-Score that 
                                                 
48 The calculation has been performed according to the original model as explained in Edward 




is remarkably below the index’s average, thus appearing financially weaker and 
more likely to slide into bankruptcy than the average DJIA company. In fact the 
average index Z-Score ranges from 2.37 (2009) to 2.70 (2001), being close to the 
safe and sound area (> 3.00), whereas the above mentioned rating triggers users’ 
Z-Score reach at its peak the score of 2.13 (Alcoa Inc. in 2007), while being in 
many cases close to 1.00 (AT&T Inc. and General Electric Co. in particular) (see 
Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
So it is possible to notice that the use of rating trigger appears to be positively 
correlated with a low Z-Score and then with a high probability of being 
financially impaired. 
Finally, an interesting finding that goes beyond the scope of the current analysis 
but that is worth mentioning concerns the clear discrepancy between General 
Electric credit rating and its Z-Score. In fact, according to the rating agencies the 
company should be considered so safe to deserve for several years the highest 
rating (AAA/Aaa); on the contrary, according to its very low Z-Score the 
company appears to be in a situation of financial distress. The explanation behind 
this mismatch can probably be found in the further qualitative factors that the 
rating agencies incorporate in their evaluation (e.g. the company strategic position 
in its market segment, its relationships with foreign governments and with politics 
in general, etc.), factors whose relevance and magnitude however largely depend 




In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that a rating trigger is a powerful yet difficult 
to control contractual device. 
A rating trigger fundamentally acts as a debt covenant whose activation can be 
monitored and whose pledge can be enforced by the lender at an extremely low 
cost. Such features make the rating trigger a remarkably effective clause in 
alleviating asset substitution problems and in lowering the cost of borrowing 
 
 
capital and have consequently contribute to its popularity among those companies 
that issue considerable amounts of debt. 
Furthermore, the advantages that rating triggers bring to the lenders’ monitoring 
make the inclusion of such type of clause in a debt contract a powerful signal on 
the reliability and the soundness of the borrower, capable of counterbalancing 
those adverse selection problems that are very common among debt issuers. 
However, rating triggers also show a troublesome dark side. First, they work as 
credit cliff enhancers, since they amplify the pro-cyclical effect of credit rating. In 
fact, rating triggers get activated by credit rating downgrades that depend on a 
decline in a company’s credit risk. The more severe is such decline (and the 
consequent rating downgrade), the more difficult will be for the company to 
access the credit market paying a proportionate interest. If the described 
downgrade also activates the rating trigger, the company will in fact be force to 
comply with a very expansive pledge right in the hardest moment to comply with 
it, making the company’s financial conditions even more seriously impaired. 
Second, rating triggers act as a disturbance factor in the rating process itself. In 
fact, a credit rating is a picture of an issuer’s credit risk and it is based on a certain 
set of relevant information and on the rating agencies estimations. Rating agencies 
cannot properly incorporate in their evaluations the effect that the rating action 
(downgrade or upgrade) itself will have on the issuer’s risk. Therefore, especially 
in the event rating triggers have not been disclosed, the agencies are not able to 
predict the consequences of the triggers’ activation and to anticipate them by 
incorporating them in their evaluations. Hence, rating triggers act as a risk factor 
that is activated by credit rating and that at the very same time affects it, making 
the rating attributed by the agencies diverging from the issuer’s actual credit risk 
level. 
For these reasons, the regulator has to take some action in order to further regulate 
rating triggers. The extent and the scope of such regulatory intervention depend 
on the diffusion and the magnitude of the use of such rating based contractual 
clauses among large companies. In fact, in the event rating triggers are very 
widespread and are frequently used – especially their riskiest types – by large 
companies that are in weak financial conditions, their very likely and massive 
activation is able to pose a threat on the overall market risk by enhancing a global 
credit cliff effect. 
 
 
In order to find out the appropriate answer to this need for regulation, the DJIA 
constituents have been examined and the results showed that only 20% of them 
made an extensive use of rating triggers from 2001 to 2010, according to their 
disclosure. These rating triggers’ users belong to very different industrial sectors 
and used mostly the less risky types of triggers, such as rating based collateral 
and bonding provisions and step-up triggers.  
Furthermore, from 2001 to 2010 most of these triggers’ users have had a credit 
rating below the DJIA average (being just two of them constantly higher than the 
index average rating) and sometimes such rating even got close to the speculative 
grade, which is a typical feature of high-risk issuers. 
In addition, in the very same period, all of the DJIA rating triggers’ users had a Z-
Score that was mostly lower than 1.8, thus showing their distressed conditions. By 
comparing these Z-Scores to the DJIA average Z-Score it clearly appears that the 
companies that made use of rating triggers  had a score that is remarkably lower 
than the index average and then clearly have a higher probability of going 
bankrupt than the average DJIA constituent. 
According to these described findings, it is possible to conclude that on one side 
rating triggers had been used by a minority of large companies, but on the other 
side the companies that made an extensive use of such clauses appear to be less 
sound and financially weaker than the average company of the same size and 
relevance, and then are more subject to the triggers’ activation and to its 
destabilizing global effects. 
In this scenario, any radical regulatory actions such as a rule that under certain 
circumstances allow the regulator to block the activation of triggers – as proposed 
by the European Parliament in 2004 - seems to be well beyond the market needs 
and will not ultimately benefit the debt market, since it will turn any rating 
triggers into void and unreliable pledges, nullifying de facto their benefits related 
to asset substitution and adverse selection problems. 
Conversely, provided that the set of rules concerning market disclosure in the 
United States and in Europe do not currently pose a clear and specific obligation 
on debt issuers to periodically disclose the rating triggers they use, the most 
reasonable and efficient regulatory option seems the introduction in both legal 
systems of a new specific disclosure requirement mandating listed companies and 
relevant issuers to disclose in their annual statements all the rating triggers they 
 
 
have subscribed within the fiscal year. This rule will act as a presumption of 
materiality of all the debt covenant based on credit rating and will surely provide 
the market with a better information, allowing borrowers and potential lenders to 
make reliable decisions and even allowing the rating agencies to make more 




Table 1: Rating triggers found in DJIA constituents’ annual statements 
(2001-2010) 
COMPANY NAME 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
3M Co. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alcoa Inc. 
2 
step 3 step 3 step 3 step 3 step 3 step 3 step 3 step 2 step 1 step










accel 0 0 0 0 0
AT&T Inc. 1 put 1 step 2  coll 2 coll 
2  coll 2 coll 1 coll 1 coll 1 coll 1 coll 
Bank of America Corp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Boeing Co. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Caterpillar Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chevron Corp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cisco Systems Inc. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 coll 
Coca-Cola Co. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
& Co. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Exxon Mobil Corp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
General Electric Co. 1 coll 1 coll 4 coll 4 coll 4 coll 4 coll 1 coll 1 coll  
1 coll 1 coll 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 
0 1 put 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Home Depot Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Intel Corp. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
International Business 
Machines Corp. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Johnson & Johnson 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
2 coll 2 coll 2  coll 2 coll 2 coll 2 coll 2 coll 2 coll 2 coll 2 coll 
Kraft Foods Inc. Cl A 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 put 1 put 1 put 1 put 
McDonald's Corp. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Merck & Co. Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Microsoft Corp. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pfizer Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 coll 
Procter & Gamble Co. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Travelers Cos. Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
United Technologies 
Corp. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Verizon Communications 
Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Walt Disney Co. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
coll. = rating based collateral and bonding provisions; step. = step-up triggers; accel. = 
acceleration triggers;  put = rating based put provision.
 
 




NAME 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alcoa Inc. 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 2
American 
Express Co. 6 6 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
AT&T Inc. 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
General Electric 
Co. 1 1 4 4 4 4 1 1 1 1
JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2







Table 3: Rating triggers users’ credit rating (2001 – 2010)  
(letter scale)  
 
Company Name  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Alcoa Inc. A+ A A A A A BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BBB- 
American Express Co. A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A A- A- 
AT&T Inc. A- BBB+ A- BBB A A A A A A 
General Electric Co. AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AAA AA+ AA+ 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. AA- AA- A+ AA- AA- AA- AA AA AA AA- 










Moody's Rating S&P's Rating Numerical Scale 
Aaa AAA 5.25 
Aa1 AA+ 5.00 
Aa2 AA 4.75 
Aa3 AA- 4.50 
A1 A+ 4.25 
A2 A 4.00 
A3 A- 3.75 
Baa1 BBB+ 3.50 
Baa2 BBB 3.25 
Baa3 BBB- 3.00 
Ba1 BB+ 2.75 
Ba2 BB 2.50 
Ba3 BB- 2.25 
B1 B+ 2.00 
B2 B 1.75 
B3 B- 1.50 
Caa1 CCC+ 1.25 
Caa2 CCC 1.00 
Caa3 CCC- 0.75 
Ca CC 0.50 
C C 0.25 




Table 5 : Rating triggers users’ credit rating (2001-2010) 
(numerical scale) 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alcoa Inc. 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.00
American 
Express Co. 4.25 4.25 4.25 4,25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75
AT&T Inc. 3.75 3.50 3.75 3.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
General Electric 
Co. 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.00 5.00
JPMorgan 
Chase & Co. 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.50
Kraft Foods Inc. 4.00 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25
DJIA Index 




Figure 1 : Rating performance of the companies using triggers compared to 
the average DJIA rating performance.  
 
 
Table 6: DJIA constituents’ Z-Score 
 
DJIA Z-Scores 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
3M Co. 3.28 3.40 3.52 3.52 3.72 3.68 3.75 3.45 3.44 3.63
Alcoa Inc. 1.85 1.54 1.63 1.80 1.83 2.02 2.13 1.57 1.13 1.39
American Express Co. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
AT&T Inc. 1.41 1.53 1.49 1.24 1.02 0.93 1.23 1.21 1.25 1.25
Bank of America Corp. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
Boeing Co. 1.97 1.70 1.50 1.57 1.52 1.83 2.02 1.87 1.79 1.8 
Caterpillar Inc. 1.49 1.38 1.41 1.55 1.70 1.81 1.79 1.61 1.36 1.69
Chevron Corp. 2.68 2.33 3.06 3.65 3.45 3.72 3.55 4.13 3.13 3.47
Cisco Systems Inc. 3.01 3.21 3.22 3.17 2.96 2.36 2.54 2.56 2.32 2.20
Coca-Cola Co. 3.79 3.60 3.48 3.34 3.82 3.88 3.05 3.35 3.18 2.60
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 2.23 1.79 1.55 1.86 1.94 2.12 2.12 1.83 1.71 2.01
Exxon Mobil Corp. 3.49 3.27 3.66 3.97 4.68 4.82 4.72 5.65 4.05 3.74
General Electric Co. 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.14 1.19
Hewlett-Packard Co. 2.57 1.82 2.20 2.33 2.31 2.46 2.43 1.97 2.08 2.02
Home Depot Inc. 5.06 4.81 4.65 4.59 4.44 4.43 3.90 3.10 3.00 3.09
Intel Corp. 4.43 4.57 4.93 5.19 4.62 4.19 4.33 4.28 4.21 4.84
International Business Machines Corp. 2.19 1.83 2.00 2.12 2.23 2.31 2.21 2.52 2.78 2.84
Johnson & Johnson 3.73 3.57 3.46 3.36 4.17 3.24 3.11 3.25 3.17 3.23
JPMorgan Chase & Co. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
Kraft Foods Inc. 1.35 1.49 1,59 1.60 1.71 1.76 1.30 1.50 1.58 1.32
McDonald's Corp. 2.64 2.46 2.63 2.80 2.91 3.22 3.09 3.60 3.50 3.56
Merck & Co. Inc. 3.30 3.32 2.94 2.85 2.86 2.69 2.33 3.04 2.03 1.79
Microsoft Corp. 4.46 4.07 4.12 4.39 2.90 2.37 1.54 2.21 2.12 2.52
Pfizer Inc. 3.26 3.08 1.66 2.08 2.12 2.67 2.34 1.59 1.26 1.53
Procter & Gamble Co. 2.44 2.25 2.47 1.97 1.97 1.76 1.86 1.96 2.00 2.62
Travelers Cos. Inc. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
United Technologies Corp. 2.29 2.30 2.14 2.19 2.19 2.42 2.46 2.43 2.46 2.53
Verizon Communications Inc. 0.64 0.80 0.76 0.98 1.01 0.99 1.11 1.06 0.90 0.82
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 3.84 4.11 4.01 3.84 3.73 3.53 3.62 3.71 3.82 3.96
Walt Disney Co. 1.77 1.57 1.67 1.77 1.93 2.05 2.22 2.30 2.33 2.31






Table 7 : DJIA Rating triggers’ users Z-Score 
 
Company Name 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Alcoa Inc. 1.85 1.54 1.63 1.80 1.83 2.02 2.13 1.57 1.13 1.39
American Express Co. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
AT&T Inc. 1.41 1.53 1.49 1.24 1.02 0.93 1.23 1.21 1.25 1.25
General Electric Co. 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.15 1.10 1.10 1.14 1.19
JPMorgan Chase & Co. nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr nr 
Kraft Foods Inc. Cl A 1.35 1.49 1.59 1.60 1.71 1.76 1.30 1.50 1.58 1.32






Figure 2 : Rating triggers’ users Z-Score performance compared to the 
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